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COMMENTS
PLAY IT AGAIN SAM:
NEW YORK'S RENEWED EFFORT TO ENACT A
"SON OF SAM" LAW THAT PASSES
CONSTITUTIONAL MUSTER
I. INTRODUCTION
From 1976-1977, New York neighborhoods were terrorized by serial
killer David Berkowitz who killed or severely injured more than a dozen
people over the course of an eighteen month crime rampage.' In August
of 1977, Berkowitz, known as the "Son of Sam,"2 was finally arrested.3
After his arrest, Berkowitz sold the exclusive rights to the story of his
crimes. The public became outraged, and the New York legislature vowed
to devise a way to prevent criminals from profiting from their crimes.4
On August 11, 1977, the New York legislature enacted section 632-a
of the Executive Law, commonly referred to as the "Son of Sam" law.5
This law required criminals to forfeit any earnings from the sale of their
criminal stories to the New York State Crime Victims Board.6 The money
collected would then be placed into an escrow account, used to compensate
the criminals' victims. This money was only available to victims who
obtained civil judgments against the wrongdoer within a period of five
years from the time the account was established.7 Ironically, the law was
never actually applied to Berkowitz. He was declared incompetent to stand
trial and, at that time, the law only applied to convicted criminals.8
I. Mark Conrad. The Demise of New York's 'Son of San' Law-The Supreme Court Upholds
Convicts' Rights to Sell Their Stories, N.Y. ST. BJ., MarJApr. 1992, at 28.
2. Berkowitz was known as the "Son of Sam" because of the way he signed letters to various
New York area newspapers. Peter Bowles, Recalling a Serial Killer, NEWSDAY, June 20, 1990,
at 7.
3. Id. at 7.
4. Conrad, supra note 1, at 29.
5. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991).
6. IS
7. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(7) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991); The statute of limitations
for victims who seek civil judgments against the criminal is also five years. Id. at § 632-a(1).
8. Dennis Hevesi, Cases Under "Sam" Law: Notorious but Few, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1991,
at B8.
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The validity of the Son of Sam law was challenged in Simon &
Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Board.9 The New York State Crime
Victims Board applied the Son of Sam law to publisher Simon & Schuster,
requiring the publisher to surrender payments owed to reputed mobster
Henry Hill for the rights to publish a book detailing his criminal ex-
ploits." The Court applied a strict scrutiny test" and found the law
unconstitutional because it was not "narrowly tailored," although it served
a "compelling" state interest." In doing so, the Court not only struck
down New York's Son of Sam law, but also placed in doubt the constitu-
tional validity of similar laws in forty other states 3 as well as a similar
federal law. 4
This Comment will review the different tests applied to laws
restricting speech," the procedural history of Simon & Schuster,6 and
9. Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
10. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
11. See infra text accompanying note 87.
12. 112 S. Ct. at 512.
13. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 41-9-80 (1982 & Supp. 1990); ALAsKA STAT. § 12.61.020
(1990); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4202 (1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-90-308 (1987); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 2225 (West Supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4.1-201 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 54-218 (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. iL 11, §§ 9101-06 (1987 & Supp. 1990); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 944.512 (West Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-31 (1982); HAw. REV. STAT.
§§ 351-81 to -88 (1988); IDAHO CODE § 19-5301 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, para. 403
(Smith-Hurd 1989 & Supp. 1990); IND. CODE §§ 16-7-3.7-2 to -6 (1988); IOWA CODE ANN. §
910.15 (West Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7319 (Supp. 1990); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
346.165 (Baldwin 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:1831 to 1839 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 764 (1988); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 258A, § 8 (Law Co-op. 1980 &
Supp. 1991); MiCH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.768 (West Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
611A.68 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 99-38-1 to -11 (Supp. 1990); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 595.045 (Vernon Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-9-104(1)(d) (1989); NEB.
REv. STAT. §§ 81-1836 to -1840 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 217.265 (Michie 1986); NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 52:4b-28 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-22-22 (1990); OHIo
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2969.01-.06 (1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 17 (West Supp. 1990); OR.
REV. STAT. § 147.275 (1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tiL 71, § 180-7.18 (Pardon 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 12-25.1-3 (Supp. 1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-59-40 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990); S.D.
CODIFIED LAwS ANN. § 23A-28A-1 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-13-202 (1980 & Supp.
1990); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. ar. 8309-1, §16 (Vernon Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. §
78-11-12.5 (1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.68200 (Supp. 1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 949.165
(West Supp. 1990); WYo. STAT. § 1-40-112(d) (1988) (cited in Karen M. Ecker & Margot J.
O'Brien, Note, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti: Can New York's Son of Sam Law Survive
First Amendment Challenge?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1075, 1075 n.6 (1991)).
14. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3681-82 (West Supp. 1993).
15. See infra notes 31-44 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 70-84 and accompanying text.
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the test applied by the Court in Simon & Schuster.7 This Comment then
argues that the Court applied an overly strict standard to the law and should
have applied a more relaxed standard as with indirect burdens on speech.S
This Comment will argue, alternatively, that the Court should have denied
this form of speech First Amendment protection altogether-as is done with
obscene speech, "fighting words," and other undeserving areas. 9 Finally,
this Comment will analyze recent efforts by the New York legislature to
enact a new Son of Sam law that would address the Court's concerns,
20
and whether this new law can clear the high hurdle set by Simon &
Schuster.21
I. CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
A. The First Amendment
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press."' Although this appears to be a complete prohibition of
restrictions on speech, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that there are
limitations on this seemingly absolute right to free speech.24 Some types
of speech receive no First Amendment protection whatsoever; these include
obscenity,25 child pornography, "fighting words,"27 and advocacy of
17. See infra notes 88-102 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 113-34 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
23. The First Amendment provides in full: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
24. RONALD ROTUNDA Er AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE § 20.7, at 19 (1986).
25. For a discussion of the obscenity exception, see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)
(defining obscenity as material, that taken as a whole, the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, would find appeals to the prurient interest in sex; depicts in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the state law; and lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value).
26. For a discussion of the child pornography exception, see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 763 (1982) ("classifying child pornography as a category of material outside the protection
of the First Amendment is not incompatible with our earlier decisions").
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illegal 'conduct.2 In all other areas of speech, the Court considers the
"strength of the [Flirst [A]mendment rights in relation to the other
individual rights." To evaluate the validity of laws restricting these
other areas of speech, the Court utilizes various standards of judicial review."
B. Standards of Review
In determining the appropriate standard of review, the Court must first
determine whether the speech at issue falls within the protected classes of
speech.3 As mentioned earlier, if a law restricting speech is aimed at the
lewd and obscene, the libelous, misrepresentations, advocacy of illegal
conduct, or "fighting words," it will be upheld because these categories of
speech are not protected by the First Amendment.32 However, if a law
applies to speech not falling within one of these narrow categories, the
speech is afforded First Amendment protection. Thus, the Court must
decide what level of scrutiny to apply.3
The appropriate standard of review is determined by whether the law
directly and intentionally suppresses speech or merely incidentally
suppresses speech.' If a statute is directly aimed at suppressing protected
speech, precedent requires that such statute be subjected to "strict scruti-
ny."3 To survive this level of scrutiny, a law must serve a compelling
state interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.36 To
27. For a discussion of the "fighting words" exception, see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (defining "fighting words" as words that "inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace").
28. For a discussion of advocacy of illegal conduct, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
447 (1969) (holding that speech "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action [that]
is likely to incite or produce such action" is unprotected speech).
29. ROTUNDA, supra note 24, at 20.
30. ROTUNDA, supra note 24, § 20.6, at 14.
31. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
32. Id.; see supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
33. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
34. Karen M. Ecker & Margot J. O'Brien, supra note 13, at 1083.
35. See Arkansas Writer's Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221,230 (1987) (imposing strict
scrutiny to invalidate a content-based magazine tax); Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct 1438 (1991)
(stating that strict scrutiny will be applied to direct burdens on speech for fear that allowing the
Government to directly burden speech may allow it to drive certain ideas from the marketplace);
see also Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 583
(1983) (holding strict scrutiny applicable to a special tax on the press because it indirectly
regulates speech).
36. Arkansas Writer's Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221,231 (1987); Perry Educ. Ass'n
v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
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qualify as a "compelling state interest," the state must have a strong interest
in actually achieving the underlying policies of the statute.37 In addition,
the state's interests must outweigh the statute's chilling effect on speech.
The law must not unduly discourage people from exercising their speech
rights for fear that the law is applicable to them.
3 8
However, if the restriction is "content-neutral 39 and only incidental-
ly burdens speech, it is subjected to the less rigorous "mid-level scrutiny"
identified in United States v. O'Brien.4 To pass this standard, the burden
on speech must further an important or substantial governmental interest.
Additionally, the incidental restriction on the First Amendment freedoms
must be no greater than is essential to further that governmental interest.
41
Strict scrutiny is not applied to content-neutral restrictions because such
laws are not aimed at suppressing expression.42
The initial determination of the correct standard of review is crucial
because the Court rarely upholds a statute that is subjected to strict
scrutiny.43  Indeed, when the Court applies strict scrutiny, the govern-
ment's burden to justify the law "is well-nigh insurmountable."'
III. NEW YORK'S SON OF SAM LAW
New York's Son of Sam law, section 632-a of the Executive Law,
was enacted in 1977.' 5 This law was intended to "ensure that monies
received by the criminal under such circumstances shall first be made
37. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981); John Timothy Loss, Note, Criminals
Selling Their Stories: The First Amendment Requires Legislative Reexamination, 72 CoRNELL L.
REV. 1331, 1340 (1987).
38. John Timothy Loss, supra note 37 at 1340.
39. A law aimed at speech is content-neutral if it is one that is "justified without reference
to the content of the regulated speech." Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc. 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
40. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The O'Brien Court refused to apply strict
scrutiny to a law forbidding the destruction of draft cards. O'Brien maintained that he was
expressing his objection to the draft and the Vietnam War by burning his draft card. Id. at 370.
41. Id at 377.
42. Id The purpose of the law at issue in O'Brien was to preserve the draft system-a non-
communicative purpose. Id
43. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
44. 1d at 425.
45. N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991).
1993]
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available to the victims of that crime for losses and suffering." 46 As the
author of the law stated:
[I]t is abhorrent to one's sense of justice and decency that an
individual... can expect to receive large sums of money for his
story once he is captured-while five people are dead, [and]
other people were injured as a result of his conduct. This bill
would make it clear that in all criminal situations, the victim
must be more important than the criminal.47
To address this sense of injustice, the law provided that:
Every person, firm .... or other legal entity contracting with
any person ... accused or convicted of a crime in this state,
with respect to the reenactment of such crime ... or from the
expression of such accused or convicted person's thoughts...
regarding that crime, shall submit a copy of such contract to the
board and pay over.. . any moneys... owing to the person so
accused or convicted or his representatives.48
According to the law, a convict is a person who is "convicted of a crime
... either by trial, guilty plea, or voluntary admission."'49
The statute required the New York State Crime Victims Board (the
"Board") to review any such publishing contracts and consider the
46. See Assembly Bill Memorandum at 9019, July 22, 1977, reprinted in Legislative Bill
Jacket, 1977 N.Y. Laws, ch. 823.
47. Memorandum of Senator Emanuel R. Gold, reprinted in 1977 NEW YORK STATE
LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 267.
48. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991). The statutory text provides
in pertinent part:
Every person, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other legal entity
contracting with any person or the representative or assignee of any person, accused
or convicted of a crime in this state, with respect to the reenactment of such crime,
by way of a movie, book, magazine article, tape recording, phonograph record,
radio or television presentation, live entertainment of any kind, or from the
expression of such accused or convicted person's thoughts, feelings, opinions or
emotions regarding such crime, shall submit a copy of such contract to the board
and pay over to the board any moneys which would otherwise, by terms of such
contract, be owing to the person so accused or convicted or his representatives.
The board shall deposit such moneys in an escrow account for the benefit of and
payable to any victim or the legal representative of any victim of crimes committed
by: (i) such convicted person; or (ii) by such accused person, but only if such
accused person is eventually convicted of the crime and provided that such victim,
within five years of the date of the establishment of such escrow account, brings
a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction and recovers a money judgment
for damages against such person or his representatives.
Id. at 632-a(1).
49. Id § 632-a(1O).
SON OF SAM LAW
following factors: (1) whether the speaker was an accused or convicted
criminal; (2) whether the published work mentioned the crime; (3) whether
the work contained any admissions of the commission of a crime, if the
speaker had not been accused or convicted of such; and (4) whether there
existed a victim of the crime mentioned."0 If all of the aforementioned
factors were determined to exist, the law required that all money derived
from the work be deposited into an escrow account and held for five years
from the date the fund was established.5 ' This money would be made
available to victims who had been awarded judgments in civil suits against
the criminal.5 2 After this five year period, the convicted criminal could
request that the Board refund any monies not claimed by victims, so long
as no civil actions were pending at that time. 3
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Factual Background
In 1985, Simon & Schuster published a book written by Nicholas
Pileggi entitled Wiseguy: Life in a Mafia Family.' It was an autobio-
graphical, nonfiction story based on the criminal exploits of Mafia member
Henry Hill which was later made into the movie Goodfellas.55 The book
was based on over two years of interviews in which Hill told Pileggi of the
many crimes he had committed, including murder, assault, extortion, theft,
burglary, arson, drug dealing and credit card fraud.56 Some of Hill's more
infamous crimes included the bribery of Boston College basketball players
in the point-shaving scandal of 1978-79 and the theft of six million dollars
from the Lufthansa Airlines terminal at Kennedy Airport in 1978." Hill
was granted immunity from prosecution for most of these crimes because
he cooperated with federal authorities by testifying against his former
colleagues.58
50. Id. § 632-a(4).
51. lId
52. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a(l) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991).
53. lI. § 632-a(4). The State must indeed refund the monies after paying creditors who
present "lawful claims, including state or local government tax authorities." Id § 632-a(1 1).
54. NICHOLAS PLEGGI, WISEGUY: LIFE IN A MAFIA FAMILY (1985).
55. Goodfellas (Warner Bros. 1990).
56. Mark Conrad, The Demise of New York's "Son of Sam" Law-The Supreme Court
Upholds Convicts' Rights to Sell Their Stories, N.Y. ST. BJ., MarJApr. 1992, at 29.
57. Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 506 (1991).
58. lId
1993]
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Through the Son of Sam law, New York's legislators sought to
address the sense of injustice caused by crime victims' loss of money (due
to lost property, lost wages and enormous medical bills) while criminals
blatantly reaped the benefits of the crimes they committed.59 As an
illustration of this injustice, Hill bragged about the lavish lifestyle he and
other Mafia members enjoyed while within the confines of a federal
prison.' He said their cells, which were within a three story building that
was outside the prison wall, "looked more like a Holiday Inn than a
prison."6 He explained how they were able to pay the dishonest prison
guards to smuggle in everything from liquor to fine foods.' These
conditions caused Hill to state that "[d]epending on what you wanted and
how much you were willing to spend, life could almost be bearable." 3
Shortly after the publication date of Pileggi's story, the Board notified
Simon & Schuster of the applicability of the Son of Sam law and
demanded a copy of the contract between the publisher and Hill." The
Board then ordered Simon & Schuster to suspend payments to Hill's
literary agent and ordered Hill to turn over $96,250 in payments that he had
already received.f' The Board asserted that the book contained "Hill's
thoughts, feelings, opinions and emotions about and admissions to his
participation in criminal activities."'
In response to the Board's order, Simon & Schuster filed an action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for
alleged violations of its constitutional rights.6 Simon & Schuster claimed
59. Gold, supra note 47.
60. NICHOLAS PI.EGGI, WISEGUY: LIFE IN A MAFIA FAMILY 150-51 (1985).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp. 170, 172
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd sub nor., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777 (2d Cir.
1990), rev'd sub nor., Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Ed., 112 S. Ct. 501
(1991).
65. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp. at 173.
66. Id. at 172.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State . . . , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
... for redress.
68. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp. 170
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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that section 632-a violated the First Amendment's protection of speech and
of the press by "interfer[ing] with.., decisions of publishers and writers"
thereby decreasing the amount of expression reaching the public.69
B. Procedural History
1. Lower Court Decision
The district court upheld the Son of Sam law. Specifically, it ruled
that section 632-a did not directly infringe on speech; rather, it merely
prevented criminals from receiving the profits of that speech.7 Thus, the
court applied O'Brien's mid-level scrutiny' t-which only requires that the
statute be narrowly drawn and the state interest be substantial, instead of
compelling.' The court found that New York's Son of Sam law met this
standard because it was narrowly drawn-not to prohibit expressive
activity, but merely "to garnish the proceeds so that they will be used in a
productive manner." The state articulated its interest as denying
criminals any gain from the stories of their crimes until the victims of those
crimes were fully compensated for all losses arising out of their victimiza-
tion.7' Finding this interest to be substantial, the district court held that
the Son of Sam law was constitutional."
2. Second Circuit Decision
a. Holding
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in a two to one decision,
affirmed the district court's holding that the Son of Sam law was constitu-
tional but relied upon much different reasoning.76 The majority first stated
that the statute directly affected a criminal's speech. The court relied upon
69. Id. at 175-76.
70. Id. at 177.
71. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
72. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp. at 178-79.
73. Id. at 179.
74. 1d. at 174.
75. Id. at 178-79.
76. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom., Simon
& Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
1993]
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the Supreme Court's holding in Meyer v. Grant to support its conclusion
that New York's Son of Sam law was a direct restriction on speech.7
The Second Circuit explained that the Meyer Court had held "that the
denial of payment for expressive activity constitutes a direct burden on that
activity." '79
Next, the court noted that since the law directly restricted speech, it
was subject to a strict scrutiny test." Therefore, the law was required to
further a compelling, not merely substantial, state interest. In addition, the
law had to be "narrowly tailored" to achieve the state's interests in denying
criminals the opportunity to profit from their crimes and in compensating
the victims."' The majority of the court found that the state had a
"compelling... interest in assuring that a criminal not profit from the
exploitation of his or her crime while the victims of that crime are in need
of compensation by reason of their victimization."82 The court then
concluded that the law was narrowly tailored to accomplish the state's
interest and thus held that the Son of Sam law was constitutional." In
contrast, the dissent found that the law was not "narrowly drawn" and
should not have been upheld."
b. Analysis of the Second Circuit's Decision
The Second Circuit's decision illustrates the confusion caused by the
application of differing standards of review to various forms of speech.
The Second Circuit misinterpreted and misapplied the holding of Meyer.
The court erroneously interpreted the Supreme Court's language to stand
for the broad proposition that any denial of payment for expressive activity
directly burdens that activity and thus subjects the law imposing the denial
to strict scrutiny. Meyer involved a Colorado statute that prohibited paying
solicitors to circulate initiative petitions. The Court found that the statute
interfered with the opportunities of the initiatives' sponsors to disseminate
their views to the public in two ways. First, the statute "imit[ed] the
number of voices who [would] convey appellees' message and the hours
77. 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
78. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d at 781-82.
79. Id at 781.
80. Id at 782.
81. Id
82. Id
83. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d at 784.
84. Id at 785.
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they [could] speak and, therefore, limit[ed] the size of the audience they
[could] reach." 5 Second, the statute made it "less likely that appellees
[would] garner the number of signatures necessary... thus limiting their
ability to make the matter the focus of statewide discussion.!' 6 The Court
classified the statute as a direct restriction on expression and therefore,
applied strict scrutiny."
To correctly apply Meyer to the First Amendment claims of Henry
Hill or the publisher Simon & Schuster, the position of these parties would
have to be analogous to the position of the appellee political groups in
Meyer. Unlike in Meyer, however, neither Hill nor the publisher attempted
to pay anyone to project their message. Rather, the publisher attempted to
pay the speaker himself, not to amplify the publisher's message, but to
compensate the speaker for the sale of his story. The Court was concerned
with protecting the speakers' ability to disseminate their message rather
than guaranteeing a source of income for the solicitors. Nothing in the Son
of Sam law prohibits or limits the criminal from projecting his message.
Therefore, the Second Circuit clearly misapplied Meyer.
C. The Supreme Court's Decision
1. Holding
Like the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court applied a strict scrutiny
test." However, the Court reached the same conclusion as the Second
Circuit's dissent-finding that as a content-based discrimination on speech,
the Son of Sam law was presumptively unconstitutional. 9 The Court
stated:
A statute is presumptively inconsistent with the First Amend-
ment if it imposes a financial burden on speakers because of the
content of their speech ... .The Son of Sam law is such a
content-based statute .... In short, the State has a compelling
interest in compensating victims from the fruits of the crime, but
little if any interest in limiting such compensation to the
proceeds of the wrongdoer's speech about the crime.'
85. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414,422-23 (1988).
86. Id at 423.
87. I. at 420.
88. Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. at 509.
89. Id at 508.
90. Id at 508-11.
1993]
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The Court was concerned that "[tjhe Board [could not] explain why the
State should have any greater interest in compensating victims from the
proceeds of such 'storytelling' than from any of the criminal's other
assets."'" Therefore, because the statute was not narrowly tailored, the
Supreme Court held that the Son of Sam law was unconstitutional.'
2. Reasoning
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, did not address whether the
statute was content-neutral by serving purposes unrelated to the content of
the regulated speech. This would have justified the application of the less
onerous O'Brien standard.93 Rather, she hastily stated that the law was
"content-based,"94 and thus subjected the law to strict scrutiny.95 In so
doing, O'Connor conceded that a compelling state interest for such a law
existed." However, O'Connor criticized the law for singling out a
criminal's proceeds from published works as opposed to compensation from
a criminal's assets in general.' O'Connor added that she could not see,
nor did the Board attempt to explain, why the state should have any greater
interest in compensating victims from the proceeds of such criminal stories
than from any of the criminal's other assets.98
In applying the second part of the strict scrutiny test-whether the
statute was narrowly tailored-the Court found the law to be "over-
inclusive"" by including those merely accused of a crime."°° Thus, the
Court determined that the law was not "narrowly tailored" to meet its
objectives."0 ' However, in reaching its decision, the Court never fully
91. Id at 510.
92. Id at 512.
93. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
94. O'Connor found the statute to be "content-based" because it "singles out income derived
from expressive activity for a burden the State places on no other income, and it is directed only
at works with a specified content." Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S.
Ct. at 508.
95. Id at 509.
96. "There can be little doubt... that the State has a compelling interest in ensuring that
victims of crime are compensated by those who harm them." Id
97. Id at 510.
98. Id
99. A speech regulation that is overinclusive is one which restricts speech more than is
necessary to serve a particular compelling state interest. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 407 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-90 (1960).
100. Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. at 511.
101. Id at 512.
SON OF SAM LAW
addressed whether the statute was "content-based," much to the lament of
Justice Kennedy."°
3. Kennedy's Concurrence
Justice Kennedy criticized the use of the strict scrutiny test applied by
the majority. 3 He argued that the statute should have been invalidated
solely on the ground that it was a content-based restriction on speech."°
The Board examined the challenged work to see whether it contained a
particular type of speech before the statute was applied to the author. They
determined that the speech in question was not in one of the areas excluded
from First Amendment protection"° and therefore, the statute should have
been invalidated simply because it was aimed at a particular form of
speech.' °6 As Kennedy stated:
Here a law is directed to speech alone where the speech is not
obscene, not defamatory, not words tantamount to an act
otherwise criminal, not an impairment of some other constitu-
tional right, not an incitement to lawless action, and not
calculated or likely to bring about imminent harm the state has
the substantive power to prevent. No further inquiry is neces-
sary to reject the State's argument that the statute should be upheld."°c
Therefore, Kennedy maintained that the majority erred in applying the strict
scrutiny test.'0
Kennedy acknowledged that the strict scrutiny test had been applied
to First Amendment cases in the past. °9 However, he also stated that
"the Court appear[ed] to have adopted this formulation in First Amendment
cases by accident...... The genesis of the test, as he pointed out, was
actually in the Equal Protection area. It then was mistakenly applied to
First Amendment cases."' Kennedy objected to any use of the strict
102. Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. CL at 512 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
103. 1& at 513.
104. 1,4
105. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
106. Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. at 515 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
107. IL at 512-13.
108. 1d. at 513.
109. Ui
110. Md
111. Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. CL at 513.
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scrutiny test because "[b]orrowing the compelling interest and narrow
tailoring analysis is ill-advised when all that is at issue is a content-based
restriction, for resort to the test might be read as a concession that States
may censor speech whenever they believe there is a compelling justification
for doing so....
V. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISIoN
In applying the strict scrutiny test to New York's Son of Sam law, the
Supreme Court applied the same flawed analysis used by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals. In determining the proper standard of review, the
Second Circuit considered whether the statute imposed a direct or merely
incidental burden on speech 1 3 The court quickly determined that the
law was a direct burden on speech and thus subjected it to strict scruti-
ny.! 4 The Second Circuit inappropriately upheld the law under the same
standard that had been determined to be nearly insurmountable-the strict
scrutiny standard.
115
The Supreme Court did nothing to correct the appellate court's flawed
analysis. In fact, presumably because it did not even consider the
possibility that the statute may have been an indirect burden on speech, the
Court ignored O'Brien completely." 6 The Court then hastily subjected
the law to strict scrutiny. This analysis was erroneous because the proper
focus should have been on the purpose behind the regulation rather than the
regulation itself."' As the Court stated in Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
"[tihe government's purpose is the controlling consideration." ' The
New York legislature's purpose behind the Son of Sam law was not to
control criminals' speech because the legislature viewed the speech as
undesirable. In fact, the statute was applicable whether the criminal
bragged about his crimes or expressed remorse. The law's purpose was
merely to prevent criminals from spending the profits gained from their
speech until they compensated their victims for the harm they caused.1 9
112. id
113. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777, 781 (2d Cir. 1990).
114. lit at 782.
115. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 90-102 and accompanying text.
117. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (where the Court repeatedly
stresses that it is the State's interest that must be thoroughly examined).
118. 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
119. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp. 170, 173 (1989).
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After focusing on the regulation's purpose, the Court should have
followed the district court's analysis' by carefully considering whether
the statute met the O'Brien' prerequisites necessary to apply mid-level
scrutiny. That is, if the restriction imposed an incidental burden on speech,
the restriction would be scrutinized under the less rigorous O'Brien test so
long as it was content-neutral, not aimed at the communicative effect of the
conduct, and left open ample alternative channels of communication.'22
If these prerequisites are met, the O'Brien test dictates that an incidental
infringement on speech can be justified if: (1) it is within the constitutional
power of the government; (2) it furthers an important or substantial
government interest; (3) the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and (4) the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest." In other words, O'Brien allows regulations that inhibit
speech to be scrutinized under its less demanding standard so long as the
government's interest is not related to the suppression of speech.'
24
In passing the statute at issue in O'Brien, Congress was not interested
in suppressing speech.25 Similarly, New York's legislature also was not
interested in suppressing speech. Its Son of Sam law does not prevent a
criminal from speaking about his criminal exploits. However, the criminal
would have to compensate eligible victims with the funds earned from such
speech. Therefore, the prerequisites of O'Brien were met because the law
was not aimed at the communicative effect of the speech. Rather, the law
was aimed at the distribution of proceeds from criminal exploits and only
required distribution to victims who had recovered civil judgments against
the criminals within five years. Thus, the law was aimed at the non-
communicative element of the criminal's conduct-the expenditure of his
profits.
Furthermore, the Son of Sam law left open not only ample alternative
channels of communication, but also left open the very channel by which
the criminal sought to express himself. The Court should have considered
whether the criminal was able to speak rather than whether the financial
disincentive would dissuade him from speaking. The criminal is not
restricted from speaking, and the media is not prohibited from publishing
120. Id at 178.
121. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
122. Id at 377.
123. Id
124. Id.
125. See supra note 42.
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these views. Rather, if he is compensated, the criminal simply must give
victims first priority to his proceeds. Additionally, as an accomplished
writer has stated, "you don't have to pay these scumbags-they'll tell you
anyway, if you're a hardworking honest journalist."' Failure to
compensate a criminal for his story raises no constitutional issues in itself
because the Court has never recognized a constitutional right to earn money
from speech."V
City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters" lends further support to a
reading of New York's Son of Sam law as an incidental, content-neutral
restriction on speech. In City of Renton, the Court upheld a zoning
ordinance that prohibited adult motion picture theaters from locating within
1,000 feet of any residential zone, church, park or school.'29 The Court
stated that the ordinance was not aimed at the content of the films shown,
even though "the ordinance treatfed] theaters that specialize in adult films
differently from other kinds of theaters."'3 Rather, the Court explained
that the ordinance was aimed at the "secondary effects of such theaters on
the surrounding community."'' The Court found that the city of
Renton's pursuit of its zoning interests was unrelated to the suppression of
free expression and applied O'Brien's mid-level scrutiny. 32 Similarly,
the Son of Sam law was aimed at the secondary effects of the criminal's
speech-the distributions of the profits gained by its dissemination. 3 3
Because the Board was interested in the compensation of victims and
not the suppression of speech, the Court erred by focusing primarily on the
regulation itself rather than closely considering the State's interest. Viewed
in its proper light, the statute imposed only an incidental burden on speech,
and thus should have been subjected only to the mid-level scrutiny of the
O'Brien test. '3 Applying mid-level scrutiny, the Court should have
found the Son of Sam law constitutional because the law furthered the
important governmental interest of compensating victims of crime.
Furthermore, the effect on the criminals' speech as a result of the law, such
as the diminished economic incentive to speak, was purely incidental. This
126. Robert M. Snider, Coming Soon to a Theater Near You, 7 CAL. LAW., April 1987 at 28,
31-32.
127. GERALD GUNTmER, CONsTrrUIONAL LAW 1107-08 (10th ed. 1980).
128. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
129. d. at 51.
130. Id. at 47.
131. Id. (emphasis in original).
132. Id. at 50.
133. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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incidental restriction on the criminals' First Amendment freedoms was no
greater than necessary to further the governmental interest. Access to these
types of profits could be gained more readily and efficiently than by trying
to locate and seize the criminals' general assets, if any.
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE
A. Requirements for a Law to Pass the Strict Scrutiny Test
The Court erred in refusing to apply the less demanding O'Brien3'
test. Rather, the Court held that the victim compensation law would be
subjected to strict scrutiny. Although the Court unanimously struck down
the law, it did not explicitly rule that all such compensation laws were per
se unconstitutional. 36 Since the Court did not categorically deny the
right to the seizure of royalties, it is possible that an amended version of
the law could pass the Court's application of strict scrutiny. To be
considered constitutional, this new law must be limited in applicability to
those actually convicted, not merely accused, of crimes. Furthermore, to
address the Court's concern with the singling out of a specific asset of the
criminal, the statute must be applicable to all of a criminal's assets, not just
proceeds of a criminal's stories about his crimes. This requirement would
actually place potential victims seeking to recover at an advantage by
maximizing the available pool of assets. 3 '
B. Requirements for a Law to Pass Kennedy's Stringent Test
Future cases of this type may be decided, as Justice Kennedy
suggested, solely on the basis of whether the law at issue is a content-based
restriction on speech. 38 If such cases were decided on this basis, and it
was determined that the law was not content-neutral, the inquiry would end
altogether because the law would be per se unconstitutional. In such a
situation, proponents of the statute could argue that criminals' stories about
their exploits should simply be another area not deserving of any First
135. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
136. Mark Conrad, The Demise of New York's 'Son of Sam' Law-The Supreme Court
Upholds Convicts' Rights to Sell Their Stories, N.Y. ST. BJ., MarJApr. 1992, at 28, 32.
137. Id, at 32.
138. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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Amendment protection. As with obscenity 39 and other types of speech
not granted any protection,)" the recounts of a criminal's exploits are of
little value to society in relation to the harm that the recounts cause to other
societal interests, such as the interest in preventing the harm caused to
crime victims. Therefore, due to the gravity of the potential harm, this type
of speech should be denied First Amendment protection altogether.
VII. NEW DEVELOPMENT: NEw YORK'S REVISED SON OF SAM LAW
A. The Retailored Statute
On July 24, 1992, the New York state legislature approved an
amended version of the Son of Sam law that addressed the concerns
expressed by the Court in Simon & Schuster. 4' The new law broadens
139. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
140. Id.
141. Act of July 24, 1992, 1992 N.Y. A.L.S. 618. Pertinent provisions of the new law read
as follows:
(Ain action by a crime victim, or the representative of a crime victim.... may be
commenced to recover damages from a defendant convicted of a crime which is the
subject of such action, for any injury or loss resulting therefrom within seven years
of the date of the crime.
Id. sec. 1, § 213(b) (emphasis added). '"Crime' means any felony defined in the penal law or any
other chapter of the consolidated laws of the state." Id. sec. 10.1(a), § 632(a).
"Profits from the crime" means (i) any property obtained through or income
generated from the commission of a crime of which the defendant was convicted;
(ii) any property obtained by or income generated from the sale, conversion or
exchange of proceeds of a crime, including any gain realized by such sale,
conversion or exchange; and (iii) any property which the defendant obtained or
income generated as a result of having committed the crime, including any assets
obtained through the use of unique knowledge obtained during the commission of,
or in preparation for the commission of, the crime, as well as any property obtained
by or income generated from the sale, conversion or exchange of such property and
any gain realized by such sale, conversion or exchange.
Id. sec. 10.1(b), § 632(a) (emphasis added).
Every person, firm, corporation .... or other legal entity which knowingly contracts
for, pays, or agrees to pay, any profit from a crime.... to a person charged with
or convicted of that crime shall give written notice to the crime victims board of
the payment, or obligation to pay as soon as practicable after discovering that the
payment or intended payment is a profit from a crime.
ld. sec. 10.2(a), § 632(a) (emphasis added).
mhe court shall consider restitution to the victim of the crime and may require
restitution as part of the sentence imposed upon a person convicted of an offense,
and after providing the district attorney with an opportunity to be heard ....
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the old statute by subjecting all of a criminal's crime-related assets to
seizure, whether they are stolen or gained by any other commission of a
crime. 42  The law gives judges in criminal cases discretion to order
reparation by defendants, regardless of whether they have sold the rights to
their stories and regardless of their ability to pay. 43 The restitution order
is similar to a lien that gives victims priority to collect from convicts any
assets they may acquire after commission of a crime.'" In order to
structure this new statute to resemble a restitution order, the New York
legislature limited the victim's reparation to actual out-of-pocket expens-
es. 145  Thus, by eliminating "pain and suffering" damages, which are
often viewed suspiciously, New York has made a further effort to shield the
law from being attacked as a direct burden on speech. The new statute also
extends the maximum time a victim has to file for civil damages against a
criminal from five to seven years after the date of the crime.'46 However,
the statute limits the amount a victim can recover from a criminal to
$15,000 for a felony and $10,000 for a misdemeanor. 4
B. Analysis of the New Statute
In finding the old Son of Sam law unconstitutional, Justice O'Connor
questioned why the law was aimed merely at the criminal's assets from his
stories about crime rather than the criminal's assets in general. 48  If
O'Connor was implying that a broader seizure of assets would survive strict
scrutiny, the new law has effectively met this concern by allowing
authorities to seize any profits made by criminals relating to their crimes,
not just profits from movies and books about their crimes. The new Son
require the defendant to make restitution of the fruits of his offense or reparation
for the actual out-of-pocket loss caused thereby.
Act of July 24, 1992, sec. 12.1, § 60.27(1), 1992 N.Y. A.L.S. 618 (emphasis added).
Except upon consent of the defendant. . ., the amount of restitution or reparation
required by the court shall not exceed fifteen thousand dollars in the case of a
conviction for a felony, or ten thousand dollars in the case of a conviction for any
offense other than a felony.
Id sec. 16(a), § 60.27(5)(a).
142. 1d. sec. 10, § 632(a).
143. Id.
144. 1d sec. 8, § 420.10(6).
145. Act of July 24, 1992, sec. 12, § 60.27(1), 1992 N.Y. A.L.S. 618.
146. Id. sec. 1, § 213(b).
147. Id. sec. 16, § 60.27(a).
148. Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 510 (1991).
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of Sam law also excludes those merely accused of crimes from its
ambit.'49 Thus, in limiting its application to convicted criminals, this
aspect of the law should also pass constitutional muster. Furthermore, the
distinction between writings of actual crimes and past crimes is no longer
an issue because the law now speaks of criminal profits in general terms
and not in relation to the distribution of profits from stories about
crime.5 0 However, because the new law applies only to proceeds the
criminal earns from actual crimes committed by him for which he was
convicted, the concern the Court expressed regarding the old law's
application to writings of past crimes' is eliminated. Therefore, this
aspect of the law should also withstand scrutiny.
The provision limiting the amount of a crime victim's recovery is a
curious one, especially since the Court did not discuss the limitations on
recovery in the prior law. 52 Rather, the Court seemed mainly concerned
with the underinclusiveness of the prior law's applicability only to
criminals' assets from storytelling. Therefore, since the new statute is not
limited to assets derived from criminals' storytelling, there seems to be no
need to impose a limit on recovery, especially since an individual victim's
losses may well exceed those limits. Perhaps, the New York State
legislature, by continuing the limits imposed by the prior Son of Sam law,
is attempting to ensure that the new law will not be subjected to the same
fate as its predecessor. The extension of the statute of limitations seems to
give victims something in return for the continued ceiling on amounts of
recovery. The New York legislature probably felt more confident in taking
this minimal action because state statutes of limitations and other procedur-
al rules are given great deference.
It is likely that the new Son of Sam law will be upheld should it be
reviewed by the Court. The Court has rarely ruled in favor of a criminal
defendant based on an alleged violation of the Constitution,5 3 except for
149. "[A]n action by a crime victim... may be commenced to recover damages from a
defendant convicted of a crime which is the subject of such action .... " Act of July 24, 1992,
sec. 1, § 213(b), 1992 N.Y. A.L.S. 618 (emphasis added).
150. "'Profits from the crime' means (i) any property obtained through or income generated
from the commission of a crime of which the defendant was convicted...." Id. sec. 10(b), §
632(a) (emphasis added).
151. Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 512 (1991).
152. The old law limited the amounts of recovery to $10,000 for a felony and $5,000 for a
misdemeanor. 1992 N.Y. A.L.S 618 at § 16.
153. David G. Savage, Pornography Case to Test Federal Racketeering Law, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
7, 1993, at A5 (noting the infrequency with which the Court rules in favor of a criminal
defendant's Constitutional challenge when a Frst Amendment violation is not alleged).
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violations of the First Amendment, as illustrated in Simon & Schuster.
However, now that this new Son of Sam law is generally applicable to all
of a criminal's crime-related assets, not just those derived from storytelling,
the First Amendment should not be implicated at all. Therefore, New
York's new Son of Sam law should be used as a model for other states'
similar laws.
One caveat should be noted: the Simon & Schuster Court never
definitively decided whether criminals' profits from stories of their crimes
would be considered to be crime-related assets."s Nevertheless, the
Court should not hesitate to hold that these profits are indeed crime-related;
after all, the criminal would be in no position to profit from his story had
there not been a crime committed in the first place.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A criminal who commits a series of brutal killings and who is later
convicted need not despair. He may soon become a millionaire as hungry
Hollywood producers pursue him for the rights to his story. New York's
Son of Sam law, as originally enacted, sought to avoid this unconscionable
result. However, the Court's decision in Simon & Schuster forced the New
York state legislature to go back to the drawing board.
An examination of First Amendment background indicates that
freedom of speech and of the press are by no means absolute. 55 Further-
more, there is no one standard the Court uses to analyze alleged restrictions
on speech or expression. 6 However, if it is determined that the speech
is within one of the areas of protected speech and the restriction directly
burdens that speech, the regulation will be subjected to a most exacting
level of scrutiny.""7
The Supreme Court erred in finding that New York's Son of Sam law
was the type of law that should fall under this strict scrutiny standard. The
Court should have carefully analyzed the New York statute to find that, at
154. The Court stated that:
[t]he parties debate whether book royalties can properly be termed the profits of
crime, but that is a question we need not address here. For the purposes of this
case, we can assume without deciding that the income escrowed by the Son of Sam
law represents the fruits of crime.
Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501,510 (1991) (emphasis added).
155. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 31-44 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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best, it imposed a mere incidental burden on speech-one that should be
properly analyzed under O'Brien's less demanding mid-level scrutiny.'
Under this analysis, the Court should have found the law constitutional.
Alternatively, the Court should have announced that recounts of a
criminal's exploits are so lacking in social value compared to the harm they
cause to other societal interests-such as ensuring that victims of crime are
adequately compensated-that this type of speech should be added to those
areas of speech and expression found undeserving of First Amendment
protection." 9 Under this alternative analysis, the Court also should have
found the law constitutional.
However, since the Court decided to apply a strict scrutiny standard
to these laws, future state or Congressional legislation of this type should
increase the scope of assets subject to seizure to all of a criminal's crime-
related assets to prevent First Amendment challenges. Future legislation
should also limit its application to convicted criminals, not those merely
accused of crimes. In addition, the law must be limited to writings of
actual crimes committed by the criminal against the victim seeking
recovery, and not to past crimes unrelated to the victim.
Indeed, the revised Son of Sam law recently enacted by the New York
legislature" limits its application in accordance with the concerns
expressed by the Simon & Schuster Court.' If O'Connor's statements
imply that a statute addressing the Court's concerns would survive the
seemingly insurmountable hurdle set by strict scrutiny, the revised Son of
Sam law appears to do so. In fact, the legislators, forced to be overly
careful to meet the Court's concerns, have risked serious under-
compensation of victims by continuing to set low limits on recovery.
Hopefully, the Court will use any litigation resulting from this new
legislation as a vehicle for putting such desirable and necessary laws on
stronger footing.
Amr F. Amer
158. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
160. 1992 N.Y. A.L.S. 618.
161. 112 S. CL 501 (1991).
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